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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to extend Miranda Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice to 
what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place 
too little or too much credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to put in place a type of indirect 
“affirmative action” plan for argument evaluation. I also situate my proposal in Johnson (2000)’s 
framework of argumentation as an exercise in manifest rationality. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to begin to develop an account of what I am calling 
argumentative injustice. Argumentative injustice is an analogue of Miranda Fricker 
(2007)’s concept of testimonial injustice, where an individual’s testimony is given less 
credibility than it ought, due to a negative identity prejudice attaching to the speaker, in 
the mind of the hearer. What I want to describe is the phenomenon of attaching reduced 
or excessive credibility to the premises of an argument, or to the strength with which an 
argument’s premises support its conclusion, due to an identity prejudice attaching to the 
arguer. When identity prejudices cause reduced or excessive credibility judgments, 
reasons fail to have the rational force that they ought. Examples are easy enough to come 
by: think of court cases where the accused is a member of some stigmatized group, and 
nobody believes him because of that. For an example involving the strength with which a 
premise-set supports its conclusion, think of what we often hear about scientists who 
believe in intelligent design: that they draw unfounded conclusions from the evidence (or 
at least that they fail to draw the correct conclusions). That criticism often seems to lean, 
not on reasons that count against an intelligent-design-reading of the evidence, but on the 
assumption that religious scientists are pursuing an agenda which prevents them from 
being able to read the evidence correctly. To my knowledge, argumentative injustice has 
not had any attention in the literature on argumentation, so I thought it an important topic 
to pursue, and given the theme of this year’s conference, I thought this an ideal venue to 
pursue it. 
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I also want to propose a way to deal with argumentative injustice, which is for 
arguers to follow a type of indirect affirmative action policy, when engaged in arguments 
with people against or in favour of whom they have an identity-prejudice. Now, this 
policy is admittedly a tool invented explicitly for the purpose of solving the problem at 
hand, but I take it to be a theoretically sound tool—it is not merely an afterthought to tack 
on to your preferred theory of argument. It can be incorporated, I imagine, into most 
theories of argumentation, and it has, so I argue, a natural place within Ralph Johnson 
(2000)’s theoretical framework, where argumentation is understood as an exercise in 
manifest rationality. Briefly, my proposal fits naturally in that theoretical framework, 
because argumentative injustice undermines the orientation toward rationality of an 
argumentative exchange—the force of reasons is no longer determining the outcome of 
the exchange—and the policy I advocate brings the exchange back toward rationality 
again. 
 I begin this paper by unpacking the concept of argumentative injustice, 
highlighting some similarities to and differences from Fricker’s concept of testimonial 
injustice. After that, I explain what I mean by an “indirect affirmative-action policy,” and 
how that policy is supposed to help us deal with cases of argumentative injustice. I go on 
to argue that argumentative injustice and the policy I propose to deal with it have a 
natural place in the conception of argumentation as an exercise in manifest rationality. I 
conclude with responses to two intuitive objections to the way that I deal with the 
problem of argumentative injustice. 
 
2. THE CONCEPT OF ARGUMENTATIVE INJUSTICE 
 
Perhaps the easiest way to make it plain just what I mean by argumentative injustice is by 
contrasting it with Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice. Testimonial injustice is a 
type of epistemic injustice, where “epistemic injustice” is understood as a harm done to 
an individual specifically in her capacity as a knower (Fricker 2007, p. 1). Testimonial 
injustice involves the unwarranted denial of an individual’s credibility, which lowers a 
person’s status in the community of knowers, preventing her from communicating 
knowledge that she has; it can deny her the particular piece of knowledge at hand, by 
causing her to doubt her own credibility; and repeated testimonial injustices can 
undermine an individual’s confidence in her ability to report truths, thereby damaging her 
capacity to generate knowledge in situations where she otherwise would. In these ways, 
individuals can be harmed just insofar as they are epistemic agents. 
 The central case of testimonial injustice is where there is a systematic, identity-
prejudicial credibility deficit (Fricker 2007, p. 28). It is always a credibility deficit, for 
Fricker, and never an excess, because, although there certainly can be identity-prejudicial 
credibility excesses, a credibility excess tends in general to work in favour of the 
individual to whom the excess is granted, rather than harming her—her capacity as a 
knower is overly esteemed, which will usually increase her epistemic capacity (Fricker 
2007, p. 20). It would therefore be a stretch to call that an injustice to her. 
 The credibility deficit involved in a case of testimonial injustice is also 
understood to be identity-prejudicial—that is, it occurs as a result of a prejudice against a 
person because of her identity as a member of a social group. The key issue here is that 
the prejudice is the result of false, epistemically irresponsible social stereotypes. We all 
employ social stereotypes very frequently; we must do so in order to engage in effective 
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real-time interaction with people, and to evaluate whether or not to believe what we are 
told. For example, that insurance salespeople are often not to be trusted very far, that 
news reporters usually are reliable with respect to particular facts about what is reported, 
and that doctors are to be trusted in matters of health, are all useful social stereotypes that 
most people in our society employ. Social stereotypes are useful heuristics, as long as 
they embody true, epistemically responsible generalizations. When we employ false, 
epistemically irresponsible stereotypes, they become misleading and potentially harmful, 
and they no longer serve their proper function. 
 Like testimonial injustice, argumentative injustice is the result of epistemically 
culpable stereotypes. But, first of all, argumentative injustices harm individuals in their 
capacity as arguers, rather than as knowers. If we take up Johnson’s view of arguments as 
manifest rationality, as I propose to do here, that means that the individuals are harmed in 
their capacity as persons capable of employing and criticizing arguments in order to 
persuade each other of truths. Argumentative injustice harms everyone involved in the 
argumentative exchange, qua arguers, by undermining the rationality of the endeavour; it 
can, if repeated enough, damage the ability of the person to whom the prejudice attaches 
to engage productively in arguments; and it can distort his status in the community of 
arguers, thereby preventing others from seeking to engage him in argument.  
 A further difference between testimonial and argumentative injustice is that, 
whereas “testimonial injustice” is a term reserved only for cases of credibility deficit, 
argumentative injustice applies equally to cases of credibility excess. Fricker’s reason for 
withholding the application of testimonial injustice to credibility excess, again, is that 
such excesses do no harm to the individual in question in her capacity as a knower, so it 
is not an injustice to her. However, credibility excesses can harm an individual in his 
capacity as an arguer, in each of the three ways that I mention above. First, they can 
derail the rationality of the particular exchange at hand, by granting the arguer more than 
his case rationally deserves, thereby bringing the argument to a conclusion that is not 
necessarily warranted. Second, systematic credibility excess can make the arguer think 
that he is a better arguer than he is, and likely enough, a better arguer than others are too, 
which would cause him to give a credibility deficit to others in argumentative situations. 
His capacity to engage well in argumentation itself would then be damaged. And third, 
the willingness of others to engage him in arguments could be reduced, which would 
harm him as an arguer by removing him from the pool of arguers. 
 A final point to note about argumentative injustice is that it can operate without 
the awareness of the one who is committing it, since prejudices are stubborn, and often 
subtle. Even people who want to be non-prejudiced may have prejudicial reactions to 
certain social groups (see Miller 2006, p.25). Now, the real-time evaluation of premises 
and premise-conclusion support is generally made quickly, and it is often, in the first 
instance, guided by our gut reactions. Since prejudices can operate in us without our 
knowledge, or with our knowledge but without our consent, and they generally cause 
emotional reactions, the snap judgments of credibility that we have to make that are 
prompted by a feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction are susceptible to distortion by our 
prejudices.  
 To be perfectly clear, I am not trying to endorse the legitimacy of appeals to 
emotion here, as in Walton (1992). Such appeals may or may not be legitimate, but they 
are always intended by the arguer, and that is not the kind of role that emotions are 
playing in the treatment I am giving. Rather, what I have in mind is analogous to Paul 
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Thagard (2006)’s take on the role of emotion in abductive inference. His view is that we 
evaluate the relative plausibility of competing explanatory hypotheses by gauging the 
feeling of happiness that comes over us when we consider each hypothesis, which can be 
a reliable indicator of multiple constraint-satisfaction by neural networks in our brains, 
indicating the coherence of the hypothesis with what else we know and with the data to 
be explained (Thagard 2006, pp. 254-256). And Thagard also points out that the feelings 
that we have in reaction to the explanatory hypotheses can be subject to “emotional 
skewers,” to factors that cause emotional reactions when they are not warranted (such as 
the desire to come up with a novel theory and acquire fame, for instance). 
 The analogue of Thagard’s view in the context of this paper is that emotional 
reactions to premises and their alleged support for their conclusions often serve as 
indicators of when to accept or to challenge arguments. Where there is a feeling of 
dissatisfaction, we will be inclined to challenge the argument, and we will try to think of 
reasons why the argument is unsatisfactory; when there is a feeling of satisfaction (or 
perhaps a mere absence of dissatisfaction), we will not—and identity-prejudice can act as 
an emotional skewer that we must be on guard against. It is important to bear in mind that 
emotional reactions can often persist in the face of reasons not to trust them—I am still 
afraid of flying despite the fact that I know that air travel is safer than travelling by car, 
for example. For this reason, it is especially important to be on guard against our false 
prejudices and the emotional reactions that they promote. 
 
 3. INDIRECT AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION 
 
The first thing to do is to attempt to identify the identity prejudices that we have. If we 
are going to be able to deal with them, first we have to know what they are. I know of no 
systematic way to go about the task of identifying our prejudices, though, so I can only 
offer some suggestions about how to go about it in a piecemeal fashion. Formal 
education, of course, is a good way to learn about our false prejudices (e.g., the group re-
training programs described in Allport (1954, pp. 491-493), which can help us both 
identify our prejudices and begin to correct them). Having conversations with people who 
are either more or less strongly prejudiced than we are can also help: noticing the 
prejudicial (or non-prejudicial) outlook of others can draw attention to our own 
prejudices. Another good way to discover our prejudices is by interacting with people 
about whom we are prejudiced and finding that they do not behave as we had expected. 
None of these suggestions is guaranteed to work, of course, especially if we are not 
already on guard against our prejudices, so the most important thing in this regard is that 
we be on the lookout for our prejudices. 
Once aware of our prejudices, the task is then to deal with them; simply knowing 
that we have certain prejudices is not enough to counteract them. The solution I am 
proposing is to implement an indirect kind of affirmative-action policy. When I began 
thinking about the problem of argumentative injustice, the solution I had in mind was a 
more direct policy of attaching “bonus points” in the evaluation of arguments put forward 
by individuals against whom we have negative identity-prejudices, in the same way that 
hiring committees at some institutions add bonus points in the consideration of 
applications for jobs from members of disadvantaged social groups. But there are two 
reasons why this direct strategy cannot work. For one thing, it relies on a conception of 
argumentative injustice as always involving a credibility deficit: adding “bonus points” in 
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the evaluation of an argument only makes sense when we have unjustly reduced the 
credibility that we place in an argument. Argumentative injustice is broader than that, 
though, as it encompasses credibility excesses as well. Now, we might modify the policy, 
so that when arguing with people against whom we have a negative identity prejudice, we 
would add points to our evaluation of their arguments, and when arguing with people in 
favour of whom we have a positive identity prejudice, we would subtract.  
 But even this modified policy is not a good solution. The notion of adding and 
subtracting points in the evaluation of the goodness of an argument rests on an 
implausible view of how we actually engage with arguments. I am not aware of any 
theory of argument appraisal involving the adding and subtracting of points in order to 
determine whether an argument is a good one. Not only is the notion of quantifying 
reasons in that way conceptually awkward, but that kind of method can only work when 
we want to gauge the comparative goodness of arguments, not the goodness of arguments 
taken by themselves. At best, the “bonus-points” type of policy will be a kind of 
metaphor for how to deal with argumentative injustice. 
 A better solution, I think, is to implement what I am calling an indirect 
affirmative-action policy. It is indirect in that it employs neither a points-based rule nor a 
quota to be filled, and in that it applies to cases of credibility excess as well as to cases of 
credibility deficit. I use the term “affirmative-action” to give the basic flavour of the 
solution: it is a policy that is aimed at levelling out credibility deficits and excesses, and 
aims to establish argumentative justice.  
 The picture of argumentation that I am working with, as I indicated above, is that 
our real-time engagement with arguments relies in part on our emotional responses. By 
and large, that emotional aspect of how we engage with arguments is a useful heuristic 
tool, so that we do not have to search for reasons for and against every claim that is made 
in order to determine whether they are reasonable to believe or not. In the ordinary case, 
when a negative emotional reaction comes up, that is a reason (readily defeasible, of 
course) not to accept some part of the argument. But when we are engaged in arguments 
with people against or in favour of whom we have a prejudice, that heuristic can easily 
malfunction, and those emotional reactions can be misleading. Given that view of how 
we engage in argumentation, the policy I am advocating is the following: 
 
1. In cases of negative identity-prejudice: when we have a negative emotional 
response, we ought not to trust it, but rather to search for reasons against the 
aspect of the argument that has raised our suspicions. If we can find such reasons, 
then we have grounds to challenge the argument. If we can find no such reasons, 
then we ought to accept the argument, despite the emotional reaction. 
 
2. In cases of positive identity prejudice: when we have a positive emotional 
response, again, we ought not to trust it, but rather to search for reasons in favour 
of the aspect of the argument that we found satisfying. If we can find such 
reasons, then the argument may be accepted. If we can find no such reasons, then 
we ought to require further reasons in support. 
 
In other words, the first part of this policy is, when we have an identity-prejudice against 
an arguer, to place the burden of proof on us if we should want to challenge some move 
in the argument: we have to come up with good reasons to doubt what an arguer says, 
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rather than requiring that the arguer come up with good reasons in support of what he has 
said. The second part of the policy is to keep the burden of proof firmly on the arguer, 
when we have an identity-prejudice in his favour, and to demand reasons in support of the 
aspects of the argument for which we cannot find good reasons on our own. So, in effect, 
when there is an identity prejudice present, the policy reverses the normal course that we 
would pursue when we have an emotional reaction to an argument. And if that means that 
our real-time interaction with arguments in such cases is significantly slowed, I think that 
that is a reasonable price to pay for keeping us from committing argumentative injustices. 
 
4. ARGUMENTATIVE INJUSTICE AND MANIFEST RATIONALITY 
 
The way that I have framed the problem of argumentative injustice, as a distortion of the 
correct functioning of emotional responses as indicators of when to accept or reject 
claims or premise-conclusion links in arguments, it seems to me that most current 
theories of argumentation can take it into account without much difficulty. Since I 
characterize the kind of failure that occurs in argumentative injustice as that of a tool 
failing to perform the function that it has in the service of our rational engagement with 
arguments, though, it seems to fit most naturally with a theory of argument such as 
Johnson (2000)’s, where argumentation is characterized as an exercise in manifest 
rationality. Johnson views arguments as intellectual products, put forward by arguers in 
order to rationally persuade an audience (2000, p. 24). Arguments, on this view, are 
essentially social and dynamic in character, so that there is always an Other, a critic, 
whom the arguer is trying to persuade, and whose criticism is sought and responded to, in 
order to make a more rational product, and to increase the likelihood of arriving at a true 
conclusion (Johnson 2000, pp. 156-157). The distinguishing characteristic of 
argumentation, on this view, is that it is manifestly rational: it must be a rational product, 
and it must also appear to be rational, both to the participants in the exchange and to 
those interested in the issue (Johnson 2000, p. 144). 
 In a case of argumentative injustice, what is happening is that the rationality of the 
enterprise is undermined: the force of reasons is no longer determining the outcome. The 
view that I put forward above, that emotional reactions to arguments are useful heuristics 
that help us identify when an argument is acceptable, is consistent with a view of 
arguments as thoroughly rational products; emotional reactions are useful tools that help 
arguments get off the ground. Rationality requires that some elements in an argument go 
undefended, or else we are off on an infinite regress of supporting reasons, and no 
argument could ever succeed; emotional reactions can help us to identify when 
undefended elements in arguments can be accepted, and when further supporting reasons 
are required, without loss of rationality. But when there are identity prejudices at work, 
they can throw off the emotional reaction that we have to a given argument. The policy 
that I advocate is, in such cases, not to trust the emotional reaction, but to search for 
reasons in support or denial of the elements of the argument that generated the reaction. 
The intended effect of that policy is to undercut the distorting effect of the prejudice, and 
bring the argumentative exchange back toward rationality. 
 Now, I expect that, despite my best efforts to cast the emotional reaction to 
arguments as a useful tool that we employ in the service of the rational evaluation of 
arguments, the objection that an emotional reaction just is not a rational thing will suggest 
itself. Emotions are not reliable trackers of truth, the objection goes, so emotional 
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reactions in a truth-oriented enterprise are bound to be suspect. By way of response, let 
me pick up on a remark in Johnson and Blair (2006, pp. 190-191): reasons and emotions 
often work together, and emotional reactions are often rational. It is rational, they point 
out, if you are walking down a street and hear gunshots, to feel fear. That feeling of fear 
puts you on edge and readies you to respond, perhaps by fleeing. So, even if emotions are 
sometimes imperfect trackers of truth, that is a far cry from holding that emotions are 
irrational. And, given that the series of supporting reasons for claims made in arguments 
must come to an end somewhere, it seems reasonable to ground that series in our 
emotional reactions, which can then serve as defeasible indicators of the acceptability of 
claims. 
 Two final points: first, I want to be clear that I am not trying to introduce the kind 
of psychologism that Peirce (1998) complains so forcefully about, where the validity of 
arguments is reduced to the feeling of logicality that we have when we see a good 
inference. My claim is only that emotional reactions are defeasible indicators of the 
rationality of aspects of arguments, not that the rationality of the arguments reduces to 
those emotional reactions. 
 Second, I also want to head off the objection that I am only giving a new cloak to 
the old, garden-variety fallacy of ad hominem. I admit that argumentative injustice and 
the ad hominem share some characteristics (especially the variety of ad hominem known 
as “poisoning the well”), but there is a crucial difference. An ad hominem attack occurs as 
part of an arguer’s case in support of a conclusion (usually, the conclusion that someone 
ought not to be followed, taken seriously, etc.), but argumentative injustice is a distortion 
in the way that people engage with arguments. For that reason, I do not think that it can 
appropriately be called a fallacy at all (except, perhaps, on the broad construal of fallacies 
as violations of the rules governing critical discussions, in van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(2004, p.175), although their discussion rules refer to moves that may be made in a 
discussion, whereas, again, argumentative injustice occurs at a more basic level than that 
of moves explicitly made). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Argumentative injustice is a real problem, I take it, and to my knowledge, it has not been 
treated yet in the literature. What I have tried to do in this paper is to work out an account 
of its nature, and to develop a policy to help sincere arguers to deal with it. I have also 
tried to show that, although the treatment of argumentative injustice that I have given 
here might be accommodated in any number of theories of argumentation, it fits most 
naturally in the framework of argumentation characterized as an exercise in manifest 
rationality. Argumentative injustice undermines the rational orientation of an 
argumentative exchange, since it is the result of a prejudice that tampers with our 
emotional reactions, which are ordinarily indicators of what is rational to accept and what 
to reject or question. The policy that I put forward is intended to restore the rationality of 
the exchange by ensuring that we do not trust our emotional reactions in cases where 
there is a credibility prejudice. 
 
         Link to commentary 
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